ࡱ> 7 bjbjUU j57|7|ha)l $ P,\ Pvv"|||rHtHtHtH/HkL3P$Q SWP |ZZ"||WPC  lPCCC| : 8rHC|rHC>CH, r Hj >%} 0;6HH\P0PHjTfBrjTHC     Chayanov and Research on the Peasantry of the PRIVATE Developing Countries Amiya Kumar Bagchi 1. The intellectual predecessors of Chayanov The magnum opus of Alexander Vasilevich Chayanov was published originally in German in 1923 (Chayanov, 1923), and republished in Russian in 1925, with additions and alterations, largely to take account of the critique of his Russian colleagues and other co-workers. It was the Russian book that was translated by R.E.F. Smith and published in English in 1966 together with an essay, On the theory of non-capitalist economic systems (Chayanov, 1966). Since the publication of that translation, Chayanovs work has been extensively used as models to be developed and applied to the study of peasants and their economic behaviour in developing economies, or to be tested or challenged as suitable starting points for studying the rural economies and the agents operating in developing countries. One of the first references to Chayanovs work occurred in the article by von Dietze in his paper, Peasantry, in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.XII (von Dietze, 1934/1937). For the next major reference we have to wait for Georgescu-Roegens paper, Economic theory and agrarian economies in the Oxford Economic Papers (Georgescu-Roegen, 1960/1966). But Chayanovs name was familiar to scholars who studied the peasantry of continental Europe, but who, for other reasons, had familiarized themselves with the literature dealing with continental, especially, eastern and southeastern Europe. Thus, for example, we find Daniel Thorner referring to Chayanovs work in a paper of 1958 (which, however, was published only in 1980, in a posthumous collection of Thorners articles: Thorner, 1980, p.307n). Chayanov, of course, was not an autodidact nor was he putting forward ideas which had no recognizable precedents in other scholars work. Chayanov considered himself a member of the group of Russian economists and agronomists going by the name of Organization and Production School, and especially acknowledged the work of J.H. von Thnen (1783-1850), the founder of location theory, and the first to use calculus for economic reasoning (Schumpeter, 1954, pp.465-66), Kirsanov, a Perm agricultural officer, and V. Kosinskii, a Kiev professor (Chayanov, 1966b, pp.35-39, 46). Chayanov built his structure on the enormous volume of data and analysis contained in the reports of the Zemstvo agricultural officers, the extensive field surveys that were carried out by him and his associates, especially after he had become an assistant professor (in 1913) of the Agricultural Institute of Petrovskoe Razumovskoe (later renamed as the Timiriyazev Agricultural Academy) and eventually the director of the Institute of Agricultural Economy (He was disgraced for allegedly anti-communist activities and dismissed in 1930). But some of Chayanovs ideas had been put forward by British colonial administrators and economists already by the early part of the nineteenth century. One of the propositions put forward by Chayanov was that under some conditions, small holder or peasant agriculture could be at least as productive or sustainable as capitalist agriculture of the kind assumed as the standard form of organization of production in a market economy by most publicists and economists (including the English classical economists). The classical political economists led by Adam Smith, the Physiocrats and David Ricardo assumed that a typical English farmer was a capitalist deploying a substantial amount of capital sand used wage labour to extract profits. The Physiocrats wanted French agriculture to be re-modelled on the English pattern, in the belief that it would make it more efficient. On the other hand, in 1806 William Thackeray, an administrator in the service of the East India Company argued in favour of direct settlement of revenue with the actual producers and small-holders (ryots as they were called in India at the time) on the ground that the small-holders were more productive and the company could realize all the rent of the land from them instead of having to share the rent with a less productive bunch of Indian, large landowners who would have the land cultivated by the ryots anyway (Thackeray, 1806/1918). Similar arguments were put forward by Thomas Munro, who persuaded the Companys government to realize the land tax (the land revenue as it was called in the official parlance) from the ryots instead of the putative landlords (Stein, 1989). These arguments were later adopted by James Mill and his son John Stuart Mill (Platteau, 1983). Chayanov criticized classical economics (with which he lumped what would now be called neoclassical economics or the marginalist school of economics) for refusing to recognize that the neat separation of rent, profit and wages presupposed fully developed market relations under which landowners, capitalists and wage-earners could be separated as different entities (even if on occasion, claimants of two or even all the three types of income share were combined in the same person). His claim was that, in fact, in most parts of the world and in most periods of history such a distinction made no sense (see especially in this connection, Chayanov, 1966a). An exactly similar point had been made by Richard Jones (1790-1855) in his treatise on rent as one of the shares of income (Jones, 1831, pp.3-11). Jones called the rent by the capitalist farmer employing wage labour to the landowner, farmers rent and bundled all the other kinds of rent as peasant rents. He distinguished four major types of the latter, viz., labour or serf rents, metayer rents, ryot rents, and cottier rents. Apart from denying that principles of Ricardian political economy could be used to analyse the determination of peasant rents, Jones made the startling claim that there was identity of the interests of landlords with those of their tenantry and the community (Ibid., p.151). This makes Jones also a predecessor of a section of the socalled Narodniks or Populists in nineteenth and early twentieth century Russia, with whose doctrines Chayanovs name was associated, especially by his critics (but also by at least one of his admirers: see Georgescu-Roegen, 1960/1966 , p.369). Chayanov certainly shared the preoccupation of the Narodniks with the condition of the peasantry and the stability and sustainability of a rural economy consisting primarily of landowning, self-employed peasants. However, in his magnum opus, he treated these peasants as independent units and not parts of mir (commune) or peasant associations. Nor did he have much to say about preserving or resurrecting in a new form any of those forms of peasant combination, although Chayanov had a very large corpus of work on peasant cooperatives (see in this connection, Kerblay, 1966). Finally, Chayanov, in his search for the determinants of balance between work and income in peasant families, consistently used the marginal utility calculus that had become the hallmark of the neoclassical school of economics. But he differed from them in one respect : he had implicitly or explicitly assumed that a peasant family had a certain maximum level of consumer satisfaction as an objective, and would not strive to go beyond that. This is a variant of the assumption of the satisficing economic agent which was made a central plank in the analysis of firm behaviour and the behaviour of organizations in general by Herbert Simon (for characteristic expositions, see Simon, 1955/1982, and 1979/1982). Interestingly enough, this connection justifies, if such a connection were needed, Chayanovs choice of affiliation to the Organization and Production School of peasant behaviour and the economics of the peasantry. It has been widely believed that Chayanovs general view that small-peasant economy could be efficient and survive under capitalist competition was antagonistic to the classic Marxist positions of Engels, Kautsky and Lenin. But Chandra (2002) has argued that Marxists , beginning with Marx himself, had recognized that peasant family farms could survive under capitalist competition through self-exploitation of labour and the use of family labour beyond the point at which profit-maximizing capitalists would find it uneconomic to use wage labour (see also in this connection, Bagchi, 1982, chapter 6). 2. Re-modelling Chayanovs model of the peasant family economy Chayanov explicitly constructed models of the peasant family in the German translation of his book (Chayanov, 1923) and he continued these models virtually unchanged in the 1925 Russian edition. In the latter, he sought to take account of the criticisms made by many of his Russian colleagues and other Russian agricultural economists. Beyond adding a substantial chapter which has been translated into English as The organizational plan of the peasant farm (Chayanov, 1966b, pp.118-194) and writing a new introduction, Chayanov did not substantially alter the argument advanced in the German version of his book (Chayanov, 1923). Most of the attempts to remodel the Chayanovian construct have followed the English translation, but it can be taken that the degree of consistency of those models with the German text can be taken as being the same as in the case of the English text. Two of the earliest and most interesting of the Chayanovesque models did not start out explicitly to formulate rigorous constructs based solely or even mainly on Chayanovs writings, but drew on ideas which are also to be found in Chayanovs work. The first of these is Georgescu-Roegen (1960/1966). In his series of models, it is assumed that production is carried on by labour operating on a composite factor of land and capital (By definition, technological change is ruled out, and most of the models are static in nature). The production function displays both diminishing returns to variations in the amount of a single factor, and diminishing returns to scale, since it is assumed that an optimum size of a single production unit can always be found (Georgescu-Roegen, 1960/1966, pp.374-375). All production is supposed to be distributed equally among these optimal units. (Under the conditions assumed, this distribution maximizes the national product). For some of the exercises, it is also assumed that beyond a certain point, increase in one of the factors of production cannot increase output. This means, among other things, that the marginal product of labour becomes zero after a point. Georgescu-Roegen assumes that there are certain minimum needs of subsistence a family of producers (a peasant family) must satisfy before it can be called upon to supply labour for any other purpose. If it happens that the average product of labour in a typical unit in such an economy is below the subsistence level of the average member of the family (taking both adults and children into account), there is no way any work can be obtained for purposes outside agriculture, without increasing the endowment of non-labour (such as land) per family. The country or region can be considered to be strictly overpopulated (Ibid., pp.378-9). A country can also be considered to be overpopulated, if the marginal product of labour is zero, that is, if it remains true that the removal of some of the workforce does not lead to a diminution of the total national product, after the reorganization of units of production so as again to equally distribute the labour and non-labour endowments among them has taken place (Ibid., pp.369-374). In such overpopulated countries, introducing capitalists who maximize profits and hence seek to equate the marginal product to wages would, without technical change, merely leads to a diminution of the total national product. As we shall see later, in the context of many regions of Russia Chayanov considered the assumption that peasant families can accommodate more working members by simply renting or buying more land to be realistic. However, students of developing economies have been more attracted by the proposition that, conditions of supply of non-labour factors combined with the assumption that the consumption needs of peasant families are invariant or inelastic with respect to changes in relative prices of goods and factors of production, leads to the low elasticity of total product with respect to changes in population. As we indicated earlier, Georgescu-Roegens construct is a Chayanovesque rather than a Chayanovian model. Although some of his assumptions are very similar to those made by Chayanov, the crucial difference is that in the case of Chayanovs theory, the drudgery of work is a continuously increasing function of the labour performed, whereas Georgescu-Roegen is rather cavalier in the treatment of labour supply function beyond the minimum required for subsistence needs of the peasant family. In another Chayanovesque model, namely, that of Amartya Sen (1966/1984), the labour supply function is rigorously modelled, but there are other assumptions which make it again a Chayanovesque rather them a Chayanovsan model. Sen was obviously aware of the work of Chayanov through his conversations with Daniel Thorner, and more specifically through Thorner (1965) which was to figure (with the addition of a few references) as Thorners introduction to Chayanov (1966b). It is legitimate to surmise that the labour supply function in Sens paper was inspired by Chayanovs work. Sen posited the existence of interpersonally comparable utility functions of consumption, and disutility functions of labour. The peasants seek to maximize the net utility of the family which is the difference of the utility of consumption and the disutility of labour performed. He then shows that this is maximized at a point at which the marginal product of labour equals the ratio of the marginal disutility of an extra hour of labourer to the marginal utility of the output produced by that hour of labour (Sen, 1966/1984, p.39). This ratio is dubbed the real cost of labour. Sens peasant family can produce for itself or for the market. In the latter case, the real cost of labour has to be divided by the price of the particular product produced by the family in terms of the consumption good (Ibid., p.40). For defining what is meant by surplus labour (or overpopulation a la Georgescu-Roegen) Sen distinguished between the number of working persons in a family and the number of working hours put in by them. If after the removal of some members of the family, the amount of output produced falls, then surplus labour does not exist. This can happen if the real cost of labour rises, while the marginal product of labour continues to fall around the point of the existing equilibrium (because of diminishing returns). In Sens words, ... such a rise in the real labour cost can take place for two reasons. First, an emigration of labour from the family reduces the number of working members , and to maintain the same level of total family labour, each remaining member has to work longer, raising the marginal disutility of effort. Second, with such withdrawal of labour there will be a rise in income of the remaining members, because there will be a smaller number of people to share the family fortune, and this will reduce the marginal utility from income. Both these effects will tend to push up the real labour cost and will shift the equilibrium to a smaller volume of family labour and output (Sen, 1966/1984, p.43). Surplus labour will exist when the real cost of labour does not rise for either of the two reasons. That means that in the relevant range around equilibrium, the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal disutility of labour for the peasant family remain constant. This can happen when the peasant family has to strive for attaining the minimum level of subsistence and can put in further work towards that end, if it is technically feasible. Thus in this model, the marginal product of labour being zero at the point of equilibrium is a sufficient but not at all a necessary condition for the existence of surplus labour. Apart from giving a more rigorous definition of the peasants seeking to minimize drudgery as posited by Chayanov, Sen treats another Chayanovian theme when he shows that if the real cost of labour is flat for the peasant family and is lower than the market wage, then a dual structure consisting of peasant holdings and capitalist farms can coexist. The capitalist farmer, in seeking to maximize profit will equate the marginal product of labour to the going wage whereas the peasant family will continue to labour until the marginal product falls to the real cost of labour as defined above (Sen, 1966/1984, pp.55-59). Sens own work in this field and subsequent attempts to test the hypothesis that in Indian agriculture there is an inverse relationship between the size of an operational holding and its productivity per acre have spawned a large literature, some which we will refer to later. Since the publication and dissemination of Chayanov (1966b) in English, a number of scholars have sought to construct Chayanovian models (e.g., Millar, 1970; Harrison, 1975; Hunt, 1978; Ellis, 1988; Schmitt, 1988). These models are not isomorphic with one another because Chayanov himself provided conceptual materials for several different types of models. One is the model of the land-owning peasant family operating the land with the labour of family members alone, and with little exchange with the market except for purchase of minimum needs of goods not produced by the family. Another is that of a similar peasant family still cultivating the land with family labour but firmly linked to the market through purchase of non-labour inputs and sale of the farm output. The third is an extension of these models to take account of the life cycle of a peasant family and formation of new families. The fourth is that of a peasant family linked to the market and to labour-hiring farms through the occasional hiring out of labour to the latter. A fifth model takes account also of use of family labour for the production of craft goods for the market during the slack season, or in case of a bad harvest. This richness of the variety of models and the claims made by Chayanov for one or the other variant in different parts of his exposition also make it difficult to test his theories against the experience of prerevolutionary Russia and Russia in the early 1920s, or the experience of western European countries before 1914, or finally the experience of Third World rural economies in the recent past. We shall first look at some of the theoretical constructs built by other scholars on the basis of Chayanovs work.In one of the earliest reformulations of Chayanovs theory following the publication of Chayanov (1966), Millar (1970) rejected Chayanovs contention that the hypothesis of profit maximization is inapplicable to the case of a peasant family as defined by him. Chayanov held that for the peasant family rent, profit and wages were indistinguishably merged in total gross income of the family, and the latter is interested in maximizing that gross income rather than profit. Millars contention was that the peasant family would be interested in maximizing profit in the usual sense and this can be reconciled with the family maximizing the total gross income by treating labour as overhead cost for which the family would have to make provision anyway. However, this reformulation implicitly assumes that (a) no members of the family hire themselves out so long as the family unit remains as it is whatever the return to such outside work is or that (b) with the optimal use of family labour its marginal value product falls short of the going wage. Harrison (1975) restated Chayanovs model of the balance between the drudgery of labour and the marginal utility of income and pointed out that 1913 had marked (as evidence he cited two publications of Chayanov between 1912 and 1913: Harrison, 1975, p.395) the discovery of Jevons Theory of Political Economy (1871) when instead of assuming a constant marginal utility of peasant family, he assumed a monotonically decreasing relation between income and marginal utility (Chayanov 1966b, pp.82-85). In a paper which sought to test Chayanovs hypotheses against the behaviour of Mbere peasant households in eastern Kenya, Hunt (1970) formulated Chayanovs model along the lines of Sen (1966) and Harrison (1975) but took explicit account of the life cycle of the peasant family as posited by Chayanov. According to her (Hunt, 1978, p.60) the following assumptions are explicitly or implicitly made by Chayanov: (i) peasant households do not employ wage labour, (ii) peasant households have entered the sphere of monetary and commodity circulation : demands may be satisfied by purchases up to the value of marketed output plus borrowing..., (iii) land is in flexible supply to all households, (iv) capital may be obtained through on-farms accumulation and the capital market, (v) in each community there is a static socially determined minimum acceptable per capita income, (vi) income per capita (over any given time period) beyond the socially acceptable minimum has diminishing marginal utility, (vii) labour input per worker (per given period) has increasing disutility. In addition the following assumptions are either explicit or implicit in the model : (viii) though peasant economies are predominantly self-sufficient they are in fact open : in particular goods may be produced for export from the region in which they are produced (explicit), (ix) the stock of technological knowledge applicable to production is available to all households (implicit), (x) access to credit is equal for all households. A peasant familys work input (and labour put in by each working member) is primarily determined in Chayanovs schema by the balance between producers and consumers in the family. Accordingly, these variables are also altered as the family completes its life cycle. At first with a small family consisting of a father, mother and one or two children, the producer/consumer balance is favourable, and the working members do not have to work very hard to satisfy the minimum consumption needs. As the number of children grow but the older children are still unable to earn their keep, the father (and mother) have to work harder to feed and clothe the family. When children attain working age and have not yet started their own families, the producer/consumer balance becomes favourable again, and the drudgery or the number of hours of work per working member declines. When children move away to start their own families on their own land which they somehow acquire, the family life cycle begins afresh. Although Chayanov mentioned social differentiation (that is, differentiation based on differential ownership of, or access to means of production) as a factor in peasant society in Russia, his own analysis was centred on demographic differentiation as sketched above (Chayanov, 1966b, chapter 1; Hunt, 1975, pp.61-64). Hunt (and others) have pointed out that Chayanovs model is consistent with a backward bending supply curve of labour (and of output marketed by peasants) but does not necessarily imply it. If the peasant familys needs are yet to be satisfied with the existing values of the farm output and output of craft goods produced by it, then an increase in the prices of those goods will elicit a normal response, but beyond the point of satisfaction of the minimum needs, the supply curves of labour and output will bend backwards. Another notable attempt to formulate Chayanovs model rigorously by using the tools of neoclassical economics was made by Ellis (1988, pp.106-113). This is the model of what he calls the drudgery averse peasant. He points out that if we drop the satisficing assumption that there is a fixed subsistence beyond which the peasant household is not interested in earning more income and that there is no market for labour, then it can be easily inferred that the engagement of successive members of the family in outside work will require higher and higher real wages, given the fact that work involves increasing marginal disutility (This can also be inferred from Sen, 1966). However, Chayanov seems to have stuck to the notion of a backward-bending supply curve as illustrated by his statement (Chayanov, 1966b, p.80) that the rate of increment of the budget considerably lags behind the rate of increment of labour productivity.... The annual intensity of labour declines under the influence of better pay. Schmitt (1992, p.935) proclaimed Chayanov as one of the founders of household economics along the lines of Gary Becker (1965), but in substance, his reformulation is an echo of Sen (1966), Harrison (1975) and Hunt (1978). The authorities mentioned so far also tried to test one or other aspect of Chayanovian or Chayanovesque theory against the experience of Russian rural economy in Chayanovs time, or the rural economies of western Europe (and the USA) before 1914, or the behaviour of the peasants or the rural sector of developing economies, especially since the 1950s. Although we will concentrate on a sketch of some of the tests or applications in the context of developing countries we will glance also at a sample of the work done in the other two areas since students of developing economies have also used these areas as benchmarks for comparative purposes. 3. The Chayanovian paradigm in the Russian countryside Chayanovs paradigm of the landowning self-employed peasant family has been counterposed by most students against the Marxist paradigm as developed by Kautsky (1899/1988) and Lenin (1899/1964). In order to appreciate the conceptual differences between their approach and Chayanovs, it is necessary to distinguish (a) between the marginalist conception of competition, and especially pure or perfect competition and all other varieties of competition and the perspective on competition embedded in classical political economy, including Marxs work in this domain, (b) between the behaviour of peasants as individual organizational units and the behaviour of particular groups or classes of peasants as a collectivity, and (c) between the notional dynamics of self-employed peasants isolated from the rest of the national economy and their actual evolution as parts of different kinds of national economies with different rates of accumulation and growth, and different types of linkage with the international economy. Marginalist economics before the socalled Sraffa-Chamberlin-Robinson revolution introducing imperfect or monopolistic competition assumed that all economic entities simply accepted the prices of products or factors of production as given and analysed the behaviour of economic agents in adjusting the use of the factors of production and the production of their wares in response to those prices (for a brief account of the marginalist school and of the turn towards theorising imperfect competition, see Roll, 1954, chapters VIII and X). Whatever did not conform to this set of very special assumptions was regarded as deviations from the norm. As Sraffa (1926) pointed out, however, deviations from pure competition in the neoclassical sense are in fact the norm in the real world and a more general theory would be needed to fit the real world. Implicitly, Chayanov, in spite of many of his justified grievances against mainstream theory, accepted the neoclassical paradigm in this respect and treated say, the phenomenon of peasants leasing in land by paying a higher rent than the landlords as a paradox to be explained, and not to be treated as yet another instance of how capitalist competition works by generally rewarding the rich and punishing the poor. Kautsky and Lenin, however, did not treat competition as obeying the norms of marginalist economics of their day, and considered that capitalists would use any instruments that came their way as means of increasing their profit, so that ceaseless change rather than stability would be the norm in an agriculture which, as well as industry, had been penetrated by capitalism. Secondly, peasants lived in society and not as isolated households with no links with one another except those mediated by the market. In fact, traditional norms of solidarity or cooperation often bound the peasants, but these norms were also modified and new rules of cooperation were often evolved as times and conditions changed (see, for example, the behaviour of lowland Scottish peasants as described by Carter, 1976). Moreover, contrary to Chayanovs assertion, by the end of the nineteenth century, marked differences had emerged in the economic and social situations of different groups of cultivators in Russia : there were landlords who managed their large estates with the help of agents, rich farmers who managed their farms mostly with the help of hired labour, middle peasants (the peasant family household as defined by Chayanov) who employed little hired labour but also worked only occasionally, if at all, as wage labourers and finally there were small peasants who had little or no land, and who made a living by acting as wage labourers or share-croppers with insecure tenure and extortionate rental terms. In this situation, landlords acted as a group or cabal as Anfimov (1969a/1998 and Anfimov 1969d/1998) dubs them, and vast numbers of peasants became dependent on them for land and access to any forms of state aid. If Chayanov had tended to overlook these ties of class solidarity, class dependence and possible class struggle, Kautsky and Lenin had tended to underestimate the ways in which middle, rich or even poor peasants could use traditional networks, including communes and peasant associations to advance their own interests and resist the onslaught of individualistically organized capitalist agriculture (for recent scholarship on the post-Emancipation rural Russia, see Vasudevan, 1988, Kingston-Mann, Mixter and Burds, 1991, Worobec, 1991 and Rosenberg, 1993). The third and final difference between Chayanovs perspective and that of Kautsky and Lenin is that the former treats the wider national and international economy as simply a black box which sends out signals to the rural economy of pre-revolutionary Russia, instead of treating the latter as inextricably entangled in the movements of the national and international economy. This difference is connected with the first, viz., the difference in the treatment of competition under capitalism. We cite a single example of the way in which changes in the national and international economy affected the fortunes of peasants and relations between peasants and landlords. Within Europe, as the development of the national economy and of countries of overseas settlement of Europeans led by the USA drew away labour from rural areas, and rural wages tended to rise. As a result, the landlords became more willing than before to lease out land to small and landless peasants, and thus attach them to the countryside and extract wage labour or even labour services from them. Thus increased self-exploitation of peasants, to use Chayanovs phrase, would have roots in movements of the national and international economy rather than in the structure of the family, as adumbrated by Chayanov. The distinction between Chayanov and his Marxist predecessors has often been taken to lie in the judgment of the former that small family-run firms can be viable even in the long run under capitalist conditions as against that of the latter that farms run only on the basis of family labour are unstable and are likely to be eventually replaced by large capitalist farms almost exclusively using wage labour (cf. Lenin, 1899/1964, chapters II-IV). In the introduction to the German edition of the book, Chayanov (1923) also tended to stress this contrast. However, the real distinction between the two groups lies in the Marxist view that operators of agricultural farms are likely to be differentiated in terms of their economic and social positions, and that this differentiation is likely to continue so long as capitalist competition prevails as against Chayanovs view that under a wide variety of conditions, the central tendency of the peasant economy is to revert to the family-operated farm. Chayanovs evidence regarding the predominance of the family-operated farm in Russia before 1914 and in the 1920s was impugned both by his contemporaries (for example, Kritsman 1926) and later students of the Russian economy such as V.P. Danilov and A.M. Anfimov (Harrison, 1977a; Anfimov, 1969b/1998, 1969c/1998; Chandra, 1985; Vasudevan, 1998a). Chayanovs statistical methods (relying mainly on proportions of various categories and simple correlation coefficients) are not convincing in many cases, and many of the inferences regarding causality cannot be substantiated without adding historical depth to the data. However, what has attracted the attention of later scholars, especially of developing economies, is the apparent durability of the family-operated farm under a wide variety of conditions, and in the next section we turn to a sample of studies by these scholars. 4. Chayanov in the developing economies : slow growth, peasant farms, and the dynamics of family formation and rural labour markets There have been many attempts by students of economics to apply Chayanovs model of the family farm only marginally engaged in waged labour either on farm or off farm, conjointly with his hypothesis that the producer/consumer balance, and hence labour put in by a working member of the family would change over the life cycle of the family. The greatest success with Chayanovs model has been claimed in the case of some countries of Africa, where the labour market is supposed to be poorly developed, especially in rural areas, where access to land is still relatively free for all members of a community, and where the labour of men and women is easily substitutable in farm work (Levi and Havinden, 1982, chapter 4; Ellis, 1988, chapter 6; Low, 1986). On the other hand, other scholars have disputed the applicability of either of the two Chayanovian frameworks to a typical African society, such as northern Nigeria, claiming that merchant capital and the state have subverted the society of self-cultivating, relatively independent peasants (see, e.g., Shenton and Lenihan, 1981). Chayanovs framework has also been used and tested against alternative theoretical perspectives for understanding the experience of the peasantry of Latin American countries (e.g., Deere and De Janvry, 1979,1981; Guillet, 1981; Cook and Binford, 1986). Finally, a very large part of the literature on peasant behaviour and agricultural growth in the Indian subcontinent has been concerned with the testing of Chayanovian or Chayanovesque propositions, although students have tended to refer directly to the lead of Amartya Sen (1962, 1964, 1966) and of Marx and Lenin, rather than of Chayanov in these areas (see, e.g., Bharadwaj, 1974; Patnaik, 1979; Abhijit Sen, 1981a and 1981b; Rao and Storm, 1995). In a careful specification of the Chayanovian framework and its application to the peasants living in the Mbere division of eastern Kenya, Hunt (1978, 1979) found that the access to the communal land was still obtainable on fairly easy terms, and families seemed to take up land for cultivation according to the needs of subsistence. The marginal products of different families differed substantially depending on the needs of the family. Hunt also found that the size of farms was positively related to the size of area cultivated, but the direction of causality could not be inferred from the evidence. However, it was found that different degrees of formal education acquired by family members and availability of regular off-farm work were major determinants of peasant income as well (Hunt, 1979, pp.276-277). Moreover, the possibilities of capital accumulation were not determined by family structure or biological limits but would depend on the familys wealth and access to information. These latter, of course, would be major movers of social or class differentiation commingling with, and even overriding, demographic differentiation. Hunt (1979, p.270) also pointed out that Chayanov ignored the reduced energy output of undernourished people and did not distinguish between returns per unit of labour time and per unit of energy input. Shenton and Lennihan (1981) in their historically-oriented study of the rural economy of Nigeria, contended that the dynamics of peasant behaviour has become inextricably linked with the role of merchant capital and the latter has dramatically altered the condition of both the production and reproduction of rural society (Shenton and Lennihan, 1981, p.65). In this respect, they were echoing the implicit or explicit conclusions of Lyaslachenko (1905/1998) and Anfimov (1969a/1998) and many other researchers working on the rural economy of pre-revolutionary Russia (Vasudevan, 1998a). Shenton and Lennihan (1981, p.65) also concluded that the conditions of production and reproduction in the Hausa society of northern Nigeria had been so altered by the actions of merchant capital, traditional and new-style power-wielders and the colonial and postcolonial state as to lead to tremendous differentiation among the peasantry and the division of the rural society into the exploiters and the exploited. In their words, the persistence of the peasantry presents us with a paradox. Peasant society persists because it is in the process of dissolution and reconstitution, that is, in the process of transformation. However, the investigation of the precise ways in which persistence and transformation work would require investigators to look closely at the differential inputs of labour put by different families into family holdings or off-farm work, the process of formation of families, and inter-generational social mobility of family members, and these are all connected with Chayanovian themes. Chayanovs framework was sought to be tested against the experience of the peasantry - almost all of them belonging to the Amerindian community - of northern Peru by Deere and de Janvry (1979,1981) and Guillet (1981). Deere and De Janvry in their study of Amerindian peasants of Cajamarca in the northern Andean region of Peru found that social differentiation on the basis of surplus extraction by the dominant group and the payment of land rent and other kinds of services to the owners of land by the peasants caused socially differentiated groups to emerge and reproduce themselves. But demographic growth among the peasants caused the new generation to begin their life cycle in other, often more vulnerable, social categories than their parents : In a situation where children are desired as important means of production and protection for the household, this demographic rationality leads to an interesting contradiction : as landed peasants strive to defend their social class status through larger families, this very instrument both slows down social differentiation for the existing households and accelerates social differentiation in society at large as more young adults are expelled from the land and engross the ranks of semiproletarians and proletarians. ... this intergenerational process of social differentiation is the dominant dynamic determinant of a changing class composition among the Cajamarcan peasantry (Deere and De Janvry, 1981, p.341). Guillet (1981) studied the peasants of the same general region in which the Deere-De Janvry enquiry was located. But he was concerned more with questions of peasants adjustment to the appearance of a cash-crop, viz., onions, as a viable alternative to the usual subsistence crops of the Andean peasantry than with questions of the reproduction of social differentiation which had been the central concern of the other enquiry. In Guillets study area peasants had some flexibility of access to land and choice of crops, and peasants consciously chose a mix of subsistence crops and onions as a way of minimizing risk and maximizing the probability of earning a subsistence. He found, however, that families with access to large amounts of land along the hillside, called puna land under the control of the community were taking to onion growing rather than people without such access: Onion growers possessed almost four times the average amount of puna land held by the total population, an indication of the breakdown of the redistributive function of the community in this ecological zone (Guillet, 1981, p.13). After examining the constraints under which peasants operated, Guillet concluded: In the political economy of agrarian societies, too often peasants have to compete against large-scale private or state enterprises which can easily respond to market opportunities at the expense of the small-scale sector (Ibid., p.21). This motif emerges repeatedly in studies of the peasantry of the developing countries, especially of Africa and Latin America. In studies of the productivity and growth of agriculture in the Indian subcontinent, one Chayanovian theme emerged some years before Chayanovs name became familiar through the appearance of his magnum opus in English. In a number of studies of farm management in India, a clearly inverse relationship seemed to emerge between the size of an operational holding and the average productivity of the land in that holding. Sen (1962, 1964, 1966) put forward the hypothesis that such a relationship was caused by the greater input of labour put into small farms by the peasants family compared with large labour-hiring farms, which in the pursuit of maximum profit, had to try and equalize the market wage with the marginal product. A thorough investigation of the differences in farm productivity revealed by the official farm management studies in the different regions of India was carried out by Krishna Bharadwaj (1974). For the data thrown up by the farm management studies carried out between 1954 and 1957, Bharadwaj found that although the inverse relationship between size and productivity could not be established in all cases, especially with disaggregated data, the postulated relationship could not be rejected (Ibid., pp.12-13). The superior productivity of smaller-sized farms could not be explained on the ground of their technical superiority or on the ground that the better quality holdings suffer a greater degree of fragmentation. The major explanatory factor turned out to be greater inputs of labour, especially family labour, put in into cultivation of particular crops and more importantly, a greater intensity of cultivation of their plots by the operators of smaller holdings. The measurement of the size of a holding on the basis of the area of land alone was questioned by some scholars (e.g., Patnaik, 1979), but on the whole, in most regions of India, the inverse relation between farm size and productivity proved to be robust (for a survey of the literature, see Abhijit Sen, 1981a and 1981b).Behind the greater intensity of labour use by operators of smaller holdings lay the fact that labour in rural areas could not find full employment, especially in the seasons of slack in agricultural work. This endemic underemployment was associated partly with the highly unequal distribution of holdings, and of economic power in general, and could be a patent reason for landless workers or poor farmers voluntarily seeking attachment or bondage with economically and socially powerful landholding families (Bagchi, 1973; Breman, 1974). The efforts of the poor peasants family led to a situation in which sharecropping could be as efficient as cultivation by self-employed peasant families (and less efficient than cultivation by labour-hiring rich farmers) since both the sharecropper and the self-employed peasant would be driven to intensify his (her) labour beyond the point at which the going wage would equal the marginal value product on a labour-hiring farm (Bagchi, 1973, 1976, 1982, chapter 6). But the availability of other inputs and the relative power of landlords and tenants could make a big difference. If irrigation is a major input and access to it is unevenly distributed, and sharecroppers were on the whole poorer than self-cultivating farmers, the intensity of irrigation and of labour use could be lower on tenanted farms as Bharadwaj (1974, pp.53-54) found in the case of Punjab (India). But where tenants were themselves big farmers and the renters-out were small peasants (such as widows) unable to cultivate their land, the reverse relationship would hold. The performance of peasants cultivating holdings of different size and hiring labour in differing proportions (of total labour used) in poor, densely populated countries such as India has to be understood in the context of highly fragmented rural labour markets and what has been dubbed intrashinkage of markets for land, labour, credit and output (for recent overviews of the literature, see Rao, 1988; Srivastava, 1989; Rao and Storm, 1995; and Radhakrishna and Sharma, 1998). A poor peasant did not really hire himself out freely in the busy or even in the slack season, or work freely on his own land, if he had to depend on a professional moneylender, landlord or a trader who would buy his crop and lend money to him for purchasing inputs. He might have to work for the landlord or the moneylender or the trader (sometimes the roles were combined in the same person or family), going against his free choice, sometimes at a lower than market wage. Similarly, a sharecropper might be constrained to choose an input combination which, together with the interest that he paid on the loan taken from the landlord, would maximize the latters income, but not the total produce from the land (Bhaduri, 1973). With suitable technical change, of course, the landlord might find it profitable to throw out the tenant and cultivate the land himself or reduce the labour input on his own farm and go in for mechanization, even if such mechanization increased unemployment all round. Choices made by peasants have to be seen as constrained by many social pressures. The question of who could become a tenant for which landlord itself might depend on local social relations and relative bargaining power of different groups (Bharadwaj and Das, 1975a, 1975b). The Kautsky-Lenin expectation of large-scale farming ultimately leading to a polarization of the rural society into a group of capitalist farmers and a majority of landless (but free) workers is often falsified because the larger national economy and the agrarian economy as an integral part of it does not generate enough accumulation to absorb the annual increments in labour force especially when the country is undergoing a high rate of demographic growth . Differentiation in rural areas in such a situation continues unabated, and a group of self-cultivating, self-employed peasants may always be identified, but they remain an insecure group whose composition changes in response to the inner dynamics of rural society as well as the dynamics of the larger society of politicians, bureaucrats, landlords, traders, industrialists, moneylenders, banks and labour contractors looking for cheap sources of migrant labour. Chayanov has a theory of family formation but no real theory of gender division of labour. The former has been found to be too rigidly tied to the notion of a family composed of a monogamous couple with their sons (who somehow always manage to obtain wives and beget the next family). The implications of the wide prevalence of families on the basis of polygyny (see, e.g., Boserup, 1970) or commensality of several generations of a kin group living in the same household cannot be easily worked out by using Chayanovs model. The differential rates of partitioning of families among groups of different social status also lie outside the purview of Chayanovs theory. In India, for example, Krishnaji (1980) found that the poorest rural households, consisting mainly of landless and very landpoor peasants tended to form new families earlier than others, and had families with smaller numbers than richer households because the young adults of the landless families could gain nothing by remaining part of the parental family and because these families experienced greater rates of mortality, especially of infants - even though the fertility levels in such families might be sometimes higher than among rich peasants and landlord families. Chayanovs theory does not make any room for differential levels of mortality and fertility among groups with different endowments of land per head. On the other hand, many large landholdings are found to be large, not because of an increase in the ratio of consumers to producers as postulated by Chayanov, but because remaining within a joint family confers advantages in terms of legal protection against creditors or rival claimants (provided, for example, by the Mitakshara law prevalent among Indian Hindus), in the management of land and other property, and wielding of political power. In a further analysis of the Indian data, Krishnaji (1995) concludes that the Indian story is one of the progressive diminution of the average size of holdings because of their subdivision, and continual increase in the mass of a pauperised labour force who have lost their land. This sequence cannot be accommodated by tinkering with Chayanovs theory. As we have noted earlier, Chayanov treats the larger national and international economy as black boxes from which market signals emanate to guide the market behaviour of peasants. However, social and political relations or political action cannot be left out of discussions of peasant behaviour, especially in the long run in which new family formation comes on the agenda. In Kerala (India), for example, land reforms and trade union activity of organized agricultural labourers have had a major impact on the behaviour of rural labour markets and the peasantry (Kannan, 1990, 1998). In West Bengal (India) political action favouring the small peasants and sharecroppers and making access to land and irrigation easier for them has led to the breaking of the ties of semi-feudalism as theorized by Bhaduri (1973) leading to agricultural stagnation or impasse (so styled by Boyce, 1987). In the 1980s West Bengal agriculture experienced a rate of growth exceeding 6 per cent, and this has been attributed by most students (e.g., Saha and Swaminathan, 1994 and Sanyal, Biswas and Bardhan, 1998) to land reforms and pro-peasant state action. As I argued earlier (Bagchi, 1987), even if the particular models put forward by Chayanov are found to be wanting (as alleged by Harrison, Patnaik, Krishnaji, De Janvry or Cook and Binford, 1986, for example), the programme of study of the behaviour of peasants as economic entities trying to survive and make their way in a world which constrains their choice in multiple ways will remain as an enduring legacy for future researchers. It is this perspective which motivated for example, the study of the Andalusian peasantry as governed by the actions of the Spanish state by Djurfeldt (1993). Again the question of the conditions under which landholding peasantry not only survived but increased in number in nineteenth century France motivated the enquiry of McPhee (1981). Agrarian capitalism with free wage labour and independent farmers has often emerged out of the self-cultivating, mainly self-employed peasants reacting to favourable market signals (Carter, 1976, 1977; Allen, 1986). But endemic underemployment with slow economic growth in most developing countries has produced vast masses of dependent peasantry some of whom might be identified as the middle peasants conceptualized by Chayanov. How they adapt to changing conditions will require new investigations and new questions - such as issues of gender division of labour, gender discrimination in work, sexual mores and property relations, the moral economy of peasants (Scott, 1976 ) and the political economy of the state and the geopolitical order which govern the peasants lives. The Chayanovian paradigm will help in these investigations, if it is combined with the Marxist perspective, the perspectives of students of gender and demography and of the political and cultural theorists investigating peasant culture and behaviour. The peasantry form too large and too variegated a part of humanity to be handled from one single perspective, however grand it way sound. 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Economic parasitism and the landed gentry, translated from the Russian, in Vasudevan, 1998, 191-198. Bagchi, A.K. 1973. Some implications of unemployment in rural areas, Economic and Political Weekly, 8(31-33), Special Number, August, 1501-1510. -----... 1976. Crop-sharing tenancy and neoclassical economics, Economic and Political Weekly, 11(3), 17 January, 74-83. -------. 1982. The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. .. 1987. Alexander, Vasilevich Chayanov (1888-1939), pp.408-409, in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds.) : The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol.1, London : Macmillan. -------. 1998. Studies on the economy of West Bengal since independence, Economic and Political Weekly, 23(47-48), 21 November-4 December, 2973-2978. Bhaduri, A. 1973. A study in agricultural backwardness under semi-feudalism, Economic Journal, Vol.83, March, 120-137. Bharadwaj, K. 1974. Production Conditions in Indian Agriculture, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. -------, and P.K. Das. 1975a. Tenurial conditions and mode of exploitation : a study of some villages in Orissa, Economic and Political Weekly, 10(5-7), Annual Number, February, 221-240. -------, and -----. 1975b. Tenurial conditions and mode of exploitation : study of some villages in Orissa, Economic and Political Weekly, 10(25-26), Review of Agriculture, A-59-A-55. Boserup, E. 1970. Womens Role in Economic Development, New York, St. Martins Press. Boyce, J. 1987. Agrarian Impasse in Bengal : Institutional Constraints to Technological Change, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Breman, J. 1974. Patronage and Exploitation : changing agrarian relations in South Gujarat, Berkeley, California, University of California Press. Carter, I. 1976. The peasantry of North-east Scotland, Journal of Peasant Studies, 3(2), January, 151-191. Carter, I. 1977. Social differentiation in the Aberdeenshire peasantry, 1696-1870, Journal of Peasant Studies, 5(1), October, 48-65. Chandra, N.K. 1985. Peasantry as a single class : a critique of Chayanov, pp.193-217 in A. Mitra (ed.): Truth Unites: Essays in Honour of Samar Sen, Calcutta, Subarnarekha. ..1992. Bukharins alternative to Stalin : Industrialisation without forced collectivisation, Journal of Peasant Studies, 20(1) (October), 96-159. .2002. The small peasant: Marxist tradition and Chayanov , in Sujata Patel, Jasodhara Bagchi and Krishna Raj (eds.), Thinking Social Science in India: Essays in Honour of Alice Thorner, New Delhi, Sage, pp. 31-45. Chayanov (Tschajanow), Alexander. 1923. Die Lebre von der bauerlichen Wirtschaft : Versuch einer Theorie der Familienwirtschaft im Landbau, Berlin, Verlagsbuchhandlung Paul Parey. Chayanov, A.V. 1966. The Theory of the Peasant Economy, trnaslated from the Russian by Christel Lane and R.E.F. Smith and edited by Daniel Thorner, Basil Kerblay and R.E.F. Smith, Homewood, Illinois (USA), Richard D. Irwin. -----. 1966a/1987. On the theory, of non-capitalist economic systems, translated from the Russian by Christel Lane in Chayanov, 1966. Reprinted (pp.1-28) in Chayanov 1987. -----. 1966b/1987. Peasant farm organization, translated from the Russian by R.E.F. Smith, in Chayanov 1966. Reprinted (pp.29-269) in Chayanov 1987. -----. 1987. The Theory of Peasant Economy. Reprint of Chayanov 1966 with a new introduction by Teodor Shanin. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Cook, S. and L. Binford. 1986. Petty commodity production, capital accumulation, and peasant differentiation : Lenin vs. Chayanov in rural Mexico, Review of Radical Political Economics, 18(4) (Winter), 1-31. Deere, C.D. and A. de Janvry. 1979. A conceptual framework for the empirical analysis of peasants, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 61(4), 601-611. .1981. Demographic and social differentiation among northern Peruvian peasants, Journal of Peasant Studies, 8(3), April, 335-366. Djurfeldt, D. 1993. Classes as clients of the state : Landlords and labourers in Andalusia, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 35(1), January, 159-182. Durrenberger, E.P. and N. Tannenbaum. 1979. A reassessment of Chayanov and his recent critics, Peasant Studies, 8(1), Winter: 48-63. -----. 1982. Chayanov and Marx, Peasant Studies, 9(2), Winter: 119-129. Ellis, Frank. 1988. Peasant Economics : Farm households and agricultural development, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Evans, G. 1988. The accursed problem : Communists and peasants, Peasant Studies, 15(2), Winter: 73-102. Forster, R. 1987. Peasants, pp.826-829 in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Vol.3, London, Macmillan. Georgescu-Roegen, N. 1960/1966. Economic theory and agrarian economics, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol.12; reprinted in N. 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Essays on the Distribution of Wealth and on the Sources of Taxation, Part I - Rent, London, John Murray. Kannan, K.P. 1990. Towards understanding the dynamics of rural labour markets : an approach based on Indian evidence, Indian Journal of Labour Economics, 33(3). 1998. State and union intervention in rural labour : a study of Kerala, pp.343-372 in Radhakrishna and Sharma, 1998. Kautsky, K. 1899/1988. Die Agrarfrage; translated into English as The Agrarian Question by Pete Burgess, with an introduction by Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin, London, Zwan Publications. Kerblay, B. 1966. A.V. Chayanov : Life, career, works, pp.xxv-lxxv, in Chayanov 1966. Kingston-Mann, E., T. Mixter and J. Burds (eds.) 1991. Peasant Economy, Culture and Politics of European Russia, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press. Krishnaji, N. 1980. Agrarian structure and family formation, Economic and Political Weekly, 15(13), 29 March, Review of Agriculture. -----. 1995. Family size and wealth - Standing Chayanov on his head in the Indian context, Journal of Peasant Studies, 22(2) (January): 261-278. Lenin, V.I. 1899/1964. The Development of Capitalism in Russia; translated from the Russian, Moscow, Progress Publishers. Levi, J. and M. Havinden. 1982. Economics of African Agriculture, London, Longman. Low, A. 1986. Agricultural Development in Southern Africa : Farm household theory and food crisis, London, James Currey. Lyashchenko, P.I. 1905/1998. The grain trade in Russia, translated from the Russian in Vasudevan, 1998, 33-57. McPhee, P. 1981. A reconsideration of the peasantry of nineteenth-century France, Peasant Studies, 9(1), Fall, 5-25. Millar, J.R. 1970. A reformulation of A.V. Chayanovs theory of the peasant economy, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 18(2) (January): 219-229. Patnaik, U. 1979. 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Swaminathan. 1994. Agricultural growth in West Bengal in the 1980s : a disaggregation by districts and crops, Economic and Political Weekly, 29(13), 26 March, Review of Agriculture: A-2 - A-11. Sanyal, M.K., P.K. Biswas and S. Bardhan. 1998. Institutional change and output growth in West Bengal agriculture, Economic and Political Weekly, 23(47-48), 21 November-4 December: 2979-2986. Schmitt, G. 1992. The rediscovery of Alexander Chayanov, History of Political Economy, 24(4) (Winter): 925-65. Schumpeter, J.A. 1954. History of Economic Analysis, New York, Oxford University Press. Scott, J.C. 1976. The Moral Economy of the Peasant : Rebellion and subsistence in South-east Asia, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press. Sen, Abhijit. 1981a. Market failure and control of labour power : towards an explanation of structure and change in Indian agriculture. Part I, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 5(3), September: 201-208. -----. 1981b. Market failure and control of labour power : towards as explanation of structure and change in Indian agriculture, Part 2, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 5(4), September: 327-350. Sen, A.K. 1962. An aspect of Indian agriculture, Economic Weekly, 14(4-6), Annual Number, February: 243-246. -----. 1964. Size of holdings and productivity, Economic Weekly, 16(5-7), Annual Number, February: 323-326. -----. 1966/1984. Peasants and dualism with or without surplus labour, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.74, October, pp.425-50; reprinted in A. Sen : Resources, Values and Development, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1984: 37-72. Shahabuddin, Q. and S. Mestelman. 1985. Uncertainty and disaster-avoidance behaviour in peasant farming : Evidence from Bangladesh, Journal of Peasant Studies, 22(1), October: 740-752. Shenton, R.W. and L. Lenihan. 1981. Capital and class : peasant differentiation in northern Niegeria, Journal of Peasant Studies, 9(1), October: 47-85. Simon, H.A. 1955/1982. A behavioural model of rational choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol.69; reprinted in Simon 1982: 239-258. -----. 1979/1982. Rational decision making in business organizations, American Economic Review, 69(4); reprinted in Simon 1982: 474-494. -----. 1982. Models of Bounded Rationality, Vol.2, Behavioural Economics and Business Organization, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. Sraffa, P. 1926. The laws of returns under competitive conditions, Economic Journal, Vol.36 (December): 525-550. Srivastava, R. 1989. Interlinked modes of exploitation in Indian agriculture during transition : a case study, Journal of Peasant Studies, 16(4), July: 493-522. Stein, B. 1989. Thomas Munro : the origins of the colonial state and his vision of empire, Delhi, Oxford University Press. Thackeray, W. 1806/1918. Memoir of Mr Thackeray, in favour of Ryotwar Permanent Settlement, being Extract from Fort St. George Consultations, 29th april 1806 reprinted in W.K. Firminger (ed.), The Fifth Report from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company dated 28th July 1812, Vol.III, Calcutta, R. Cambray & Co.: 455-465. Thorner, D. 1958/1980. The relevance of entrepreneurial economics to production by peasant households (unpublished); reprinted in D. Thorner, The Shaping of Modern India, New Delhi, Allied Publishers: 292-309. -----. 1956/1962. Agrarian revolution by census redefinition, Indian Economic Review, 3(2) (August); reprinted in Thorner and Thorner, 1962: 133-152. -----. 1965. A Post-Marxian theory of peasant economy : the school of A.V. Chayanov, Economic Weekly, 17(5-7), Annual Number (February): 227-236. Reprinted with the addition of three footnotes referring to Chayanov 1966b, as Thorner, 1966. -----. 1966. Chayanovs concept of peasant economy, pp.xi-xxiii in Chayanov, 1966. -----, and A. Thorner. 1962. Land and Labour in India, Bombay, Asia Publishing House. Vasudevan, H. 1988. Peasant land and peasant society in late Imperial Russia, The Historical Journal, 31(1): 207-222. ----- (ed.). 1998. Commercialization and Agriculture in Late Imperial Russia : Essays on Russian Economic History, translated from the Russian by Hari Vasudevan, Calcutta, K.P. Bagchi & Co. -----. 1998a. Introduction, in Vasudevan, 1998: 1-32. Von Dietze, C. 1934/1937. Peasantry in Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, ed. by E.R.A. Seligman, Vol.XII; reprinted in Vols.XI and XII combined, pp.48-53, New York, Macmillan. Worobec, C.D. 1991. Peasant Russia : Family and Community in Post-Emancipation Period, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.  Thus the allegation of Schmitt (1992) that Chayanov has been largely ignored in the literature on development economics has a rather shaky foundation.  Platteau, however does not recognize that the British servants of the East India Company in India had a priority in the espousal of such views.  Sen goes further than Chayanov in demonstrating the sustainability of self-operated family holdings in the presence of capitalist farms, when he introduces the possibility that work done in the slack and peak seasons in agriculture respectively are complementary to each other (Ibid., pp.58-59). Peasant families may find their work fully stretched in the peak seasons and the `wage gap' (that is, the difference between the market wage and `the real labour cost' of the peasant family) may vanish. However, if such a `wage gap' exists in the slack season and more work put in during that season shifts the production function of the peasant family above that of the capitalist farm with the same amount of land, then the peasant family will obtain more output per acre than the comparable capitalist farm.  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